What is a concept? How should we choose a concept?

When we write social science articles, we write about concepts. What is a concept? How do we choose the right one?

Defining “Concept”

A dictionary definition of concept is that it is “an abstract idea.” It is a thought.

For a thought to move from your head to the page and out in the world, the thought must be defined. The definition contains more concepts, each with their own definitions. The concept is a spider’s web connected to other strands & webs, and on and on.

We cannot ignore concepts and the meanings of words. Ignorance of what words mean produces a procession of unconnected “facts” which leads nowhere — certainly not to the accumulation of knowledge.

Thus, the social scientist’s job is to choose and define concepts. The definitional process may be taken from others’ work, in the form of a quote or paraphrase. Or, it may be a re-definition, in which you cite the work of others as you propose a new or nuanced definition.

Choosing Concepts

Conceptual choice and definition have problems.

  • A concept may be stretched beyond its usable boundary to become vague and meaningless. “Culture.” “Social.” And the like.
  • Some are so narrow that they are useless but for a too-small range of phenomena.
  • Some were created vague and stayed that way, like “intersectionality.”

These problems can lead to the proliferation of new words and new concepts, each with their own definitional problems and the sorry fate of being stretched too thin or condensed too much. It leads to what John Gerring called “a highly complex lexical terrain” (1999: 361). We talk past one another. We misunderstand.

But, some would argue, this fight over concepts is how science and knowledge proceeds.

We are told to be consistent with our definitions. But, it is how we define the terms, not whether we do, that matters.

Being consistent with a poorly defined term is not going to help your research project.

Dictionary definitions are helpful to start with, but they can be changed in the course of social science application. Let’s take “ethnicity:” “the fact or state of belonging to a social group that has a common national or cultural tradition.” It has some boundaries, but it’s vague. Is religion a part of ethnicity? How “common” must it be to set the boundaries between one ethnicity and another?

Thus, we need more.

A modification of Gerring’s Typology of Concepts

Gerring proposes criteria for creating, choosing, or modifying, i.e. forming, a concept (Table 1, p. 367). One can pick and choose the criteria as they wish, but choosing one criterion and ignoring another has a cost. “Tradeoffs.” The cost may be high, meaning that the concept is useless. 

In my view, Gerring’s typology is difficult to follow because, due to either his writing style or his argumentation, there are terms that are unnecessarily complicated or simply unclear.

Below, I modify Gerring’s typology with what I hope is a clear and simple way to choose a concept.

Familiarity and Resonance

Familiarity is when people recognize a concept because of their previous exposure or understanding of it. Familiar concepts are easier to grasp because people can relate them to their pre-existing knowledge. This prior knowledge serves as a foundation or anchor, making new information more digestible.

A resonant concept evokes emotions, memories, or associations in individuals. It is exposure combined with personal experience. It sticks in the mind.

When a concept possesses familiarity and resonance, it aligns with what people already know, and connects on an emotional level, making it more understandable and impactful. 

Parsimony

“Parsimony” in sociological theory refers to the principle that, all else being equal, simpler explanations are better than complex explanations. If two theories explain a phenomenon equally well, the one that makes the fewest assumptions or requires the fewest entities is preferable. This is often captured in the heuristic known as “Occam’s razor.”

A parsimonious theory is concise and straightforward. It avoids unnecessary complexities. Parsimonious theories are more easily testable and falsifiable than complex ones. Why? Because if a theory has too many variables or assumptions, it can become difficult to test thoroughly. At the end of any test, if we missed one of the large array of complexities, we may be confused as to whether it was a good test. Thus, the theory, by being unnecessarily complex, avoids falsification.

NB! Over-simplifying can lead to missing crucial aspects of the phenomena being studied. A theory should be as simple as possible, but no simpler.

A parsimonious concept is one that is defined with the least amount of complexity while still capturing its essence. It has wide applicability, meaning it can be used in a variety of contexts or scenarios without needing modification, but does not have unnecessary complications or qualifiers.

Coherence

A coherent concept has characteristics that are internally consistent and does not contain contradictions. Its different components or ideas fit together in a way that forms a clear and unified whole. Attributes of the concept should be obviously related. There is a core, or essential aspect, and all others are related to it.

Differentiation

Differentiation refers to the ability of a concept to distinguish itself from other related concepts. A well-differentiated concept has clear boundaries and specific characteristics that set it apart from other ideas. Differentiation provides clarity and precision so that others who use your work can understand precisely what you meant. Without it, people can interpret your concept in varying ways, leading to muddle and confusion.

Conclusion

In sum, we want a concept that is familiar and resonant, is parsimonious, internally and logically coherent, and can be differentiated from other concepts.

See also: Choosing Concepts: An Application of Gerring’s Typology

Readings

This is based on Gerring, John. “What makes a concept good? A criterial framework for understanding concept formation in the social sciences.” Polity 31, no. 3 (1999): 357-393.

Joshua K. Dubrow is a PhD from The Ohio State University and a Professor of Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences.

Tables of Contents

  1. Defining “Concept”
  2. Choosing Concepts
  3. A modification of Gerring’s Typology of Concepts
    1. Familiarity and Resonance
    2. Parsimony
    3. Coherence
    4. Differentiation
  4. Conclusion
    1. See also: Choosing Concepts: An Application of Gerring’s Typology